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Detention under the law of
armed conflict
Chris Jenks

Despite recent bard earned experit•nce during international ;md non-iml'fnational armed conflicts in phces like Atghanistan and Iraq. and in p<'<lC<'keeping miss.ions around the world. 1 the
international community continues to struggle pr.Kticitly and conceptually with detentfon of
bdligc'rt'nts, The struggle includes questfom Llllt,>ing from when individuals may he detained
and for how long. t<> determining the applicable legal regime. While this myriad of issues is
Yt'Xing, they are t10•ith,~r as ne\v, 2 nor tbe applinble bw as hcking, 0 as has been argued.
This chapter addresses wlut ro some has become a legal GordLm Knor - detention during
armed conflict. Similarly to i\lexander' s approach of cutting th<· knot. this chapter takes a pragmatic approach to dt:tenti.on.
This chapter vvi.ll begin by providing an overview of the traditional faw nf ann(•d conflict
(LOl\.C) applicable m detention during international armed cmrfhct (!AC), Tbe 1949 Geneva
Conventions, suppkmented hy Additional Protocol [, create a binary d~·tention system in
Li\.C - status-based dett•nrion of prisoners of war (POWs) and conduct-b;tsed detention or
intermn«nt of civi.li,ni>, Next the chapter V>ill provide an overview of the .LOAC applicable tn

Norahly MONUSC(\ the UN Mfasi<m in tbe I)emorratic Republic ufthe (>mgo, ln 20D the UN
Security (:mmcil hsued ,l wsdution creating an intcrwntinn brig;;de with the mission to t<lke otlimsive
anion to 'neutralize' th' armed gm ups thwatening stahility in e,i;tem IJRC, See U NSC R.<'S 1925 (28
May 2010), 'fhis has k,d to the UN condm:ting offr'nsiv,, npemtinm. whkh at :;ome point 'Wifl entail
c:ipturlng member.; of the ;u:med grnups, Where mdi detainees would be housed, under who;e conrrnl,
und,'rwhat cond.ition' and wh<>n/how!and w whom. tbev would be released an• all unclear,
'l For one ofrnany ex~nnples ofpre•·iom conflicts involving.non-state actor;, see 'Ihorn<lS P,;bmh:rm" Tile
Efoer !Var (Abacm l 991) (describing the Sernnd Boer \V:tr in South Africa, whkh te;1tmed belligerents
who did not wear military nnifrmm, viofatiom of th0
and n1storm of war by both sides and, in
tertm of detention, one of tbe first umcentration camp;, British miht«ry interned dk families uflfoer
Commandos),
3 S"'' Alb,~rto c;onzales, 'Decision .RE Application of the Geneva Convention on Priso1wrs ()fWar to tlw
C:on!lict with al Qaeda and the 'faliban. Memoramlmn for the Pn•skknt (25 J;.nu:uy 2i.XJ2) (reterring to
the Genev;1 Convention's limitatiom on qtwstioning pri;()ners of war'" 'obsofow' ;.aid otht•r prnvisiom

Ja,,.,

as ·qtnint'),
4 See g:Pnernlly c;,,oftrey Com ,rnd Eric 'Lil hot .kn;<'n, 'Untying the Gordian Knot: A Prnpmal for Determining the Applkability of the La\'\"C oCW,ir to tlw War on Terror· (2003) 81 frmpfr LR 787, As the
tide suggem, Com ;md Jenwn ',; ;m;;Jysis is at the broader normative levd of what fa\\· could or should
apply,
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nuu-imern:itional ~nmed conflicts {NL'\C). From there the dnpter will e:q;!ain several of the
contempo1\1ry du1lenges to tlut tradi.rional L'\C modi;•L The rim of these cb:i1lenget fa rhc•
inver:e rdatimiship betw,•en the prc,valence of the ty1x·s of armed co!ltlict and the amount of
law 1t1icdy applicable to those conflicts. While almost alI of the w:irtime detention hw applies
to JAC, the vast tmjmity of contemporary armed conflict> :ire N!AC for which little law ''xists.
Thus even to the extent that th<: 1949 Gen,~vJ Conventions framc•v,·ork could he mefol in
guiding contemporary detention opt•ratiom, tht• Cnnventiom do nut frmnaBy apply. The
chapter then discusses how. evc~n if the Co1wt•ntions were to apply, there \vould still be difficulties: should non-st:ite actors, like members of al-Qaeda, be detained as prisoners of war or
civilian intemees? Wliat does tbe arnwer to that quc~srion mean in terms of their treatment and
subseq uuu t rel ease?
The chapter couclndes by proposing that tbe 1949 c;eneva Conwntious and the 1977 Additional Protocols, outnmded aud seeming!y inapplicable though they may bt~ in some respects,
offor the most thorough, humane, realistic and readily available option fi.1f determining bow to
trt'at and \vhen to release non-state actors detained during a NIAG Tbis chapter proposes m cut
the legal Gordian Knot \Vith a policy ''vord. intt'rmingling types and applicatiom of the law of
arn1c~d conflict and conflating tn'atment standards from Geneva Convention HI with the civilian
internment and refoase provfaiom of Gt•neva Convention JV.

1 Authority to detain in international armed conflict
The LOAC does nor provide positive authority to detain. hldeed the LOAC dtws not, in and
ofitsdf, pn::Yide authority for conduct of any kind. !lather th<~ LO AC consists of international
rules designed to humanise armed contiict to the extt~nt possible by limiring its effects. Tbat said,
dekntion is considered within the nature of, 5 or inherent to. 6 amied conflict, at least
during lAC
The vast majority of the LOAC on detention, notably all frmr of the l 949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I, fa only trigf,<ered by IAC (;iv en that, rt•viewing the traditional
model of dett•ntion in JAC before addressing dt'tention in NU\C fa appropti;;te.

2 IAC model: POWs and civilian internment
The traditional modd of detention in armed conflict is based on Li\.C - state on state \Varfare
\\ith a dear end. Tbis is not sm11rising given the devdopment of tht~ 1949 G<·neva Convcntiorn
in the aftermath of the Second World \Var. which involv<~d global-scale armed conflict bet\veen
5 'fhe US Supreme Court confronted the issue of authority to dNain in Hamdi v RumsfNd. a case brought
by a US citizen derain<•d during hostilit.ies in Afghani>t:uL While acknowk'dging dmt the domPstic hw
authorising 'all nuessary and appropriate force· did not refor to detention. the Court stared th«t 'detention to prevent a cmnbat;.mt's n•rum w the battlefield is a fonzfamental incident of Wilging war' a proposition on which the c:omt daimed 'universal agrez~ment and practice·: Hamdi t' f(Jmhjdd, 54J US 507,
519 (1004}. See Ex JMrte Quirin, 317 US 1, 31 (1942). ;t1ting that
[ljawfo! combatants ;;re rnbjr'ct to rnpture and detention '" prisoners of war by opposing mihr.ary
forc{'S. Unfa.,,vfol combatants are hkcwiS<' subject to capture and det('ntion, bm in addition they are
subject to trial and punishment by military rribun,1ls for acts which f<)n<.for their belligerency
uniawfol.

6 Jdena I\:jic, "fbe Protective Scope of Common Artide 3: More than Meets the Eye' c;o 11) 93 IRR. C
189, 207 (>tating th,1t '[ijn the l(~RC\ view, both treaty and cmtom.ary lJ1L contain Jn inh<'rem power
to intern}
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the rnnlti-~t:ite A.xi$ t(>rce' and the multi-,;tak Allies. T!w t:'nd:; of the various conflicts we're'
mwqnivocal. with !taly. Gt'mi:my and tinallv Jipan signing fonn,il imtrumenb of surrender.
The trigger for the• ,ipplicatfon of this Lm· fa found in \vlnt is known as Common i\rticle 1.
so mrned became it i' tbe same in each of the four 1949 Geneva Convl:'ntions. Common Arrick
2 states rhat tbe Gt•neva Com·<~miom ·sh::iH Apply to all cast's of decLm·d w.ir or of :my other
armed conflict which tmy arise between two or mort' of the High Contracting P.imes. even if
the stare of ,·var is not n•cognized by one' of tbem' .7
When there i:< an !AC. in temis of dctemion the rdevanr nmventiom ,m: Ge1wv;1 Convc·ntfon rn. devotc'd to POW.::. and Geneva Conv,;nrion JV, ·which ddails regnlati<ms frir tbe tn:.<tment of imernt'e>, civiliam det<dned!imemed a' s<·curity threats.

2.1 Geneva Convention Ill: status-based detention of POWs
i\t a strategic L·vd, capturing membt•rs oft.he opposing frlfce in amied cnuflict is one ofnumt'rous meJsun.'s employed as part of Jn overall effort to bring the c•nemy in the collective St'nse to
submissJOn. At a llJ!Towec tJctical or operational kvt'l, by capturing and incapacitating memlwrs
oftht• opposing frJrce the capturing force ensures it doc-snot face those' same member-; in future
engag:<:•ments.
Capturing a member nfdw enemy force is ba,ed on thdr status ,1;; such, nor on an individualised assessment of thc'ir threat." Th.:· LOAC presumes rhat belligerent opt'ratives 'are pan of the
mi!irnry potential oftbe c•1wmy and it is thc'refort' always Lnvfol to arrack [and thus to capture)
rhem f\}r th<~ purpose of \Wakening: that potentiaL 9 As tbe ICR.C acknowledges, 'lp]risoners of
w.ir may be intt•rned . , , for no indhidual reason, The purpose of this inrc•mm<~nt is not to
punish tl1em, but only to hinder their direct participation in hostilities and/or to protect
them'_w

To qualify fr)r P()\X/ srntm nndt:r Geneva Convention l !L .m individual must fall in one of
the following catt·gories liskd in Article .+(A) oftht• Convention:
(l) Mt'mbers of the armed frnn•s of a party to the contlkt as well as m<•mben ofmihtia or
voluntt•er corps frmning part of such amied forces.
(2) Mt'mlwrs of other militias and members of ot.her volunteer rorps, including those of
org,mizeJ resistaun' movements, bdonging to a Party to the conflict and oper,iting in
or outside tbeir own territory, even if this territory is occupit•d, provitlc•d tbat such
mHiti,is or volunteer corps, including such organiud resistance movements. fulfil.! the
fo!lowing conditions:
7 S<><' GCHI-lV common att 2, Nut.e the prescient nature of the rrip:gcr not to n'quire a declaration of-war
but link the appl.katkm of the Geneva c:onvent.iom to the udm'nCt) of armd conflict benveen state>,
lmk<'d since the Second ·world '\X/ar wbilP th;'re bJve been num<OT\)U> arrm•rl <.:onflicts, there hJve het)Il
U'W dt)daradom of w,u-, Some of the R'W pmt-1949 .:onventiom declautiom war include the 1978 'A~lf
between Som;tlia and Ethiopfa. tlK' 1980 Iran-k1q W;;.r, the 1982 war h)t\Wi'n the UK. and Argentina and
tb« JOOS conflict hetvd:<'!l Ch.id a1ld Sudan. In tcnm of the Geneva C:onvemimt~ only applying to H.igh
C:ontrarring p,lrties. t:V<)ry St«itr' in the world ha> '>i)4lh'd or acceded. to th(' (:onVdltions.
3 See Ceofli:ey S C:om, Laurie R. Blank, c:hris .fPnk:; .rnd Erir Talbot Jensen, 'Br,lligerent ·rarg,)ting and
dw Inv.ilidity of a Lu1st Ffarmfol Meam Ituie· {2013) 89 lnten1<1fi1ltMi Lm' Studies 536.
9 M;m::o Sass<'lli andLaurnM Olson, 'The Rdatiomhip ber.veen lntem:.ttional H.umanitaria:nand Lhmwn
Rights Law •vb'n' it Matter>: Admis>ib!e Killing and lntemment of Fighters in Non-fnt>?mation;,il
Anned Conflict;' (2003) 90 JRRC' 599. 606,
10 Jv1:m::o SJsS<).li, Antoine A Bouvier and Anne Quintin. H<'ll' Does Lm• Pn.>ted in Wo1? (Jrd edn. lCRC
20l l) IO.

,,f
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(;;)

that of being cornm;mdc•d by a person respomibk· frlr his subordinates:
tbat of li;ivins a fixed distinctive sign rec,)gniubk .it :1 distance:
that of carrying ;mm opt•nly:
(d) tb;H of conducting: tbeir opt•rations in accordJ.nCt' with tbt• laws and customs of
waL
of r<~guLtr amwd forces \Vho profess allegiance to a government or an author[h~rnining PoweL
(4) Pemms who accompany tbe armed forces without actually being members tbereof
such as civilian members of military aircr;itt crews. war correspondents. supply contractors, mc•mbers oflabour units or oh<'f\ices rc•spori,;ible for th.:· wdfare oftbe armed
fi:irct>s, provided that they have rc•ceived authorization from tbe arnwd forc1:•s which
they accompany. who sball pn)\ide them for tbat puqxise \\ith an identity c,mJ similar
to the annexed model.
(5) Mcombers of crews, including: masters. pilots and Jpprc•ndces, nfthe mt•rdunt mar]ne
and th,• cre\\'S of civil aircraft of the Parties to the conflict, who do not benefit by more
favourable treatment under any other provisions ofinknutiona[ law.
!nhabitant~ of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the t.'nemy spontaneously take up ,mm; ro J«".'.iist rh,• invading forces. without having had time rn fonn
themselves into regular amied units, pro\ided thc•y carry ,1mh np,•nly and respect tbe
laws <ind cusroms of war.

('.'>)

M.t•mber~

ity not rt•cognized hy the

Notably, only c:itegories {!). {2). (3) and
involve combatants, nwaning those imbued with
the right to directly partidpah' in hostilities.11 A.s will bt• discussed Liter, categori<'S (4) and (5)
are civilians who an:' uonetheless c'ntided to POW status and rreatmt'nt, but who lack the right
to participate directly in hostilities.
Wht're tlh:tt' is doubt co1Keming whetJier or not « bdhgt•rent \vho }ns falk•n into th<~ hands
oftbe <'nemy h<.•long" to om' of the POW categories, Article 5 of Geneva Convention!![ provides th,it 'such person:; shaH enjoy the prnt<'ction of tlw present Convention until such timt' as
their status h<is been det<•rmined by a competent tribnnar. Until mch an ·Artidt• 5 tribunal'
determines otherwise, the default setting or rebutrabk· presumption is that a nptnrt•d bdligt•rent
is entitlt'd to POW status,
POW status me.ms an individual is emitled to bt' trt:ated undt•r tbe term~ of Geneva Convention HL 12 Tbe Convention provitfos robust and dt'L\ilt:d protections at ,ill stages, Part !![ of the
Convention is titled 'C!ptivity' and is broken into sections ,ind corresponding protecti<ms,
Section l deals with the bt•ginning of captivity and Section [] about internment of PO\Vs,
Section .!! is subdivided into chapters which cover imies including qmrters. food and dotbing

I 1 Military nwdical and religious pN,;omwl exdmivdy engaged in the raw of the skk and woundd.
while m''mben of the arni""l foret's are considered mm-c()mb,1tants cl> they do not h;ive th(;' right m
directly jxuticipate in ho;tiliti<•s. When raptured, tht>y ,1re nor POWs bur rather are 'retained pNsnnneL .Essentially a capturing force may retain them to prnl'idi' spiritual and medical asmtann' to PC/\Vs
hm must rde.~se them as soon :ts rh,~y ;1re not rt~quired w prol'idi' such Jssistance, See GC:lll art 3'.t Sc'c'
furtlwr Jarnl's P .Benoit.. 'Wounded and sick, and medical services' ch 13 in this volume.
12 Rl'tuming m tho$\:' ci.tegorit;s of POWs who .m: combatants :md have the right to direct partidp,wion,
>Vith th:it right com1:'> tlie combatant's privilege, nkaning that comb,1tants 'cwnot b,, hdd crimi1ul
H'Spomibl,; frn hwfol belligerent ~Ct' [like '>hooting ,md killintt an enemy soldier] during w«rtime·:
Lmrie ft Blank .md Ckgory P Noone. lnl<t11wifouai lAw m1J Amwd (>:iuJlkt: Hmtlam('Hfiil Prinrip/c,- aud
C•ntcm;wmy (:'li.d!,,1w'> in rhe Law<:;( vViir (.Aspen 2013) 243,
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of POWs, hygiene• and medic,11 atknrion. rdigiom. imelk·ctual and physical acthitie~. discipline\ rank of PO\'i/s ,ind tramG:r ofPO\\·s «fi:c•r tbeir arrival in a POW camp. Section l []covers
POW L1bour, Section lV deals with POW financial resources. St•ctfons V and Vf address PO\V
relations \Vi th tbe exterior ,md the authorities respectively. Tbe remit is ;i foH p,moply of prntectiom, including tbe right to hmrune treatment, protc>ction from insults .md public curiosity.
equal tre&tment, frt•e nninr,~nance and mt~dical cire and freedom from r<~prisals.
Under G,~1wu Convention m, 'lp]risoners of war ~ball be rcleas,•d and repatriated witbout
delay afrer th« cess:<tion of acrive bosrilities'. 13 Even before the cessation of bostilities. indeed
throughout the conflict, state partjes 'are bound to send back to rh,•ir own countrv, regardle"
of number or rank, seriously wounded and seiiously sick prisoners of war', 1'
This is yer anotber demonstration of the <lltemaring ov«r and under breadth of dw LOAC.
States nuy detain members of the enemy fiircc' lnsed on their stams as ,\ rnembc•r of the frirct'.
And the belligerent need not pose a threat. at the rim« of captTlfC, But because the purpose of
the POW detention n•gime is to incapacitart' and prevent helligerems from returning to the
fight. POW detention lasts only as long as tbe tm<.krlying conflict, The• statm-h1sed POW
det"mion regime is fimdamentally different from when detaining dvilians, who may bt< detJ.ilh~d
or interned bast•d on thdr conduct and only for so long as tht'Y pose a security rhreat.

22 Geneva Convention IV: conduct-based internment of civilians
Gern~va CollV<'ntion IV addresses tht~ prntection of civilians in tink' of armed conflict. 1' The

lt'vd ;md tj1)e of prott•ctions dep~·nds on the kKatiou of tht~ fr,iJLm and tbe rnamwr in which
the dvi.lfan is e:q>eri<~ndng the impact ofhostilitit·~. }\l! person<. who are not taking an .ictin· part
in the hostilities receive the protections Common /i.rride 3 affi:irds_ 16 The dcforly, women and
driklren, those in occupied territorks. all receive additional protections. Hut c;t•neva Convention rv also recognises that under certain dn:umstances civilians may be detained, not became
of 11'1w they art' but for wtnt they Are ,foi11g. So in contrast to the grams-based POW 1.fotention
n'gime, tbe detention ofdvilians is conduct based, Nnnethelt•ss. before evaluating \Vhat conduct
makes a civilian liabk• for internmrnt, inquiry hlto who exactly gu:ilifw~ as a civilian is
required.

1'.l GClll art 118.
14 GClll ai:t 109.
13 'fhe need frn this prokction stems. at k•:t>t in jXllt, fr()m th<' tiKt that civili,ms an> killt'd or w<nmded in
almost every ;urned nmtlict in far gre,ixer mtmhen than rmnbatants . In a ;tory ()n the si.xtidb ;mniv0r>arv of the 1949 Geneva C:mwentiom the BBC claimed that 'in World \V;u: L the ratio ofwldier5 w
civ.iliam killed was 10 to one. In '"rlw Sc•rnnd \Vorld War it b,~curw 30-50, and today the figures ak
;ilmost n'n'rsed - up to 10 civiliam for r'\'el)' one soldier'. lrnogen Foulh~s, 'C;eneva Conventions'
Stmg;_i:;k for Respect' BBC ,\fews (B Augmt 2009). nev;s.bbcrn.ukiJ!hi!el!rope/8J96166.stm . For a
more contemporary r<~presentation, the number ofA(dm.i civilians killed in 2U13 {2,959) romiderably
e.\n•eds the rnm t()tal ofall US fatahtie; in A(t;h.mistan from 2001 through 2f1.U (2,5 L3). See UN AMA,
'Civikrn Casualties in Afghan Conflkt Rfar• by 14 per ct•nt in 2(ll :r Pre>; Refoase (il February 2014-).
imanu .unmi;siom.org/Port;J>/ U NA..MA!humJn%20rights! Fd,_8_2014_PoC-report_20l 3-P REN G-fina.L pdf; iCarnalti<:'>, 'Operation .Enduring: Freedom', icastwlti"'S,org.:oet'.
16 Sirnihr to common arr 2 discmsi'd above. ,:onunon ;irt 5 is
mmt•d bec.;me it b the s:mk in <'ach of
the• 1949 G::lh'V;l c:onventi()m. Common art 5 wquire> tlnt th.Hi' not activdy patticipating in tht~
;,rmcd contl.i<t he treated huni;mely and pmtectPd from viokm-e, being made a bostag«, outrage' upon
pPrsonal dignity and the pas&ing of >entences and the carryinit out of executions •vithout a prnnouncement by,, rr•g1tlady rnmtituted conn. See GClll-!V art 3.
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The definition of civilian is not as straightfonvanl as might be expeckd. Despite' Geneva
devot(•d to civili<nK the ConventJon does not formally ddine thi: tt'm1. 17
Convt'tition JV
It was not until 1977 and A.ddirional Prnmcol l that tbe first treaty ddinition of civilian emc•rgetL
lterngnising the ditfa:nlty in dnfi:ing a comprehensive iist of ewryom• considered a civilian. the
drafters of .i\dditional Protocol [ chose to adopt ;i definitfon of tcxclusion, or a negative defini-·
tion. Under Article 50 ofAdditfonal Protocol L :i civilfan is m1y('ll<" who does not fall under one
of the combatant cakgories of POW from Geneva Convention IIL18
t\rride 78 of Geneva Convention !V recognises tbat '[l]f an occupying power considers it
n1c•ct'Ssary, for impc'ratiVt~ re:mms of security' tben it may intern dviiiam. 1) The civilians in an
Article 78 comext are citizens and residents of <lll ocrnpied teffito.ry. For example, lraqi5 living
m Baghdad follm'.ing the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. A.1tide 78
relaks to people >vho have not bet~n guilty of any inriingement of the penal provi<;ions
enacted by the Occupying Power, hut that Vower may, for reasom of its own, consider them
dangerous to its security and is consequently entjded to restrict their freedom oLiction. 21}
Thus ,;\rude 78 euvisiom the need frir prt~ventative or security-bis<~d d«tention of civilians
during armed conflkL ,c\s will be discussed later in t!w ch.tptt'.r, it is this kind of risk-bas<~d detention, albeit in NIAC, not IAC, th;1t gt'm'rates both discussion and contrm."ersy.
Important as detaining J civilian who poses a security rhk is, J\rtide 78 doesn't define or
qnantif~' the risk. Jnste;id, commentary to a diffi~n'llt but related s~·ction of Gem•va Convention
IV sheds some, hut not much, hgbt on the pn:·dicate requirements of ·1mperative reasom of
secnrily '. i\rtide 42 of Geneva Convention JV deals with interning civilian& of enemy nationality living in the territory of a belligerent. So while Article 78 dealt with an Iraqi living in
Baghdad under US occupation of Iraq. }\rride 42 involves au Iraqi who \\'as living in rht• US
during the armed conflict, IfUS did not repatriate the Iraqi civilian rn lraq, Article 42 prnvides
a limited basis for the US to detain th:it Iraqi civilian if the security concerns of the US rem.:!t•r
mch dekntion absolutely m•cesBry.

17 lmte;1d, GC:IV m:t 4 defines the individuals whom the c:onvc,ntion protects as 'th()>e who at a given
moment and in any manner whatsoever. rind thetn;,;•lve-;, in Gl$C of a contl.ict of occupation in th<•
hands or persom a Patty to the conflict or Ckcupying I\J\Wf of which they an• not national$'.
18 More specifirJ.lly, .API $tatcs that
a civilian is any person who •hies not belong to one of the categories of persons reforred to in
[C(:IIIJ Anide 4(a){1) [nizcmbcrs of the force]. (2l [1mm1bers of militias ·who nket the required
rnnditiomJ, (::I) {memhers of regular armed forces who pmfr'ss allegiam::e to a goverm11em of
authority not recognis('d by the detaining: powerj and (6) {kTfr m mM.ffj.
A; pwviomly dbcmsed, that leaves two rnteg:oril's ofPO\Vs - persons au::ornpanying the fr•ri:<' without
actually being members thereof (GCHI art 4(.i)(4}) ;ind membee; of merchant marin"' and civil aircufr
crews {GCHl arr 4(a)(5)). 'fhese individual$ are thm civilians but civiliam entitled to POW status and
tn,atment,
19 Elwwh<'W in c;CIV the przcdir,1te f()r internment fa ifit is 'ahsolmdy nece,;s;iry', Se<c GCIV art 42. T'he
difforence between the two articles is that unlike art 42. art 78
refates to people who have not been f,,'1.tilty of ;my infrin(,.'t'ntent of the penal pmvisiom enacted by
the Occupying Power, but that Power 1nay. fi.i:r n~arnm of its ffWn, comider tlwrn dangerous to irs
security and is comeqnent!y en tided w H'$trict their freedom of action.
c;c1v C•mmciir<11y 368
Noneil1eless, the commentary 'tares dnt internment rnmt 'observe the stipulations of artide 43'. I hid.
20 GC'Jl. Co111111cnt.iry 368.
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In addressing \\ b,1t fa meant by tenns Ii ke 'security of the St,\h' ·, the• Commentary to Article 42
states that the (biftc•rs did not bdit'.vt~ ir was pmsibk· to dd]iw the: term and that it's left
Llrgely
to Govemments to dt•cide the measure of activity pr;:jndicial to the internal or e:x:ttcrnal security of
the Stat<~ whichjmtifies internment or assigned n~sidenc,•'. 21 The Commenta1y does provide that
the mere• fact that a person is <l sul:Ject of an enemy Power cannot be considered as threatening th<' security of the country \Vhere ht· is living; it is not tht>refore J vabd reason for
interning him or placing him. in a'!Rit,l1Ied rt'sidence. To justify recourse to such uicasures the
Statt• must have good rc•ason to think that the person rnnccrm·d. by his activities, knowledge or qualifications, repn~S<'llts a real threat to its present or ti.1ture st•curityn
Significantly, the Cmmm:mary 'stresses the exceptional character of measures of internment'
and that only 'absolutely uen~ssity ... ;ind only then if security cmnot be safeguarded hy other.
!ess severe mc•;m.s•z•
Status as an imemec24 means an individual is t>ntitled to the protections of St~ction IV of
Pan U of Geneva Convention IV. This St'ctfon explains where internment cunps may (and may
not) be located, how they are to be nurkt•d and th<:.' protective measures they must provide
internees to shield them from tbe hazards of war. There are separate sections for food and clothing to be provi1fod to internees, rdi1:,>imis and physical acti\,ities, personal property and financial
resources, administration and discipline, rdatiom with the t'Xterior and p<'llal and disciplinary
sanctions. These provisions arc> similar to tbe POW treatment prnvisions from Gent>va Convention HI but som<'What less detailed.
B«cause such internnwnt is conduct based, there h a gre;iter tt>mponl limitation on irs duration tlun the 'end ofhostilities' ofstatus-bas<~d PO\V detention. The decision rn intern a civilian
is subject to an initial review ';is &oon as possible by an appropriate court or administrative board'
desit,mated by the detaining powt:r and at least semi-annua! review thereafrer. 25
Notably judida.l rt~\icw, while pt·mifasible, is nor required. Recognising that a dangerous
and austere battk•field environmt'nt may not allow judicial review, the LOAC allows an administrative board ro review civilian internment. The key to such a board fa that 'where tbe decision
is an administrative mH~. it mmt be made not hy one official hm by an administrative boJrd
offering tht> necessary guarantees ofindependence and impartiality'.~' Periodic reviews ofintemment under th<' LOAC arc automatic and are conductt'd 'with a view to favourably amending
the initfal dt•dsion if circumstances permit'.::

21 CCIV C,,1m11u:nt«ry 257-258. I!etention ofa civilian who is alleged to have violated,, pen.al provision
of tht~ dcrainin.g power is governed by att 42. The procedures frir ;nt 42 deknthm are hid nut in an 43.
While interm:Tit'nt mider art 78 is ditfrwm frun1 that under art 42, th<• c:ommzmtarv to art 78 Haws th;tt
internment must 'observe dw stipulatiom of article 43', c;CJV Commemmy .:\68. ,
22 GCIT' Ci>1m11mt.«I)' 257-258. ·riw c:on1nt<cmtary states that where :< st<te h:t' 'serious and legitimate re;min
w think that !individmtliJ are nwmhers of org:uiizatfrms whose
is to crn;;e distmbanres. or that tlu~y
may seriously pr<jndk:.~ its security by oth<c~r means, such ''' :1abotage or espionag,~' and where 'Sulwei:si n'
activity carril'd on insi<fo the krritory of a Party to dl<~ conflict or actions which are of direct assistmn• w
;m enemy Power both threaten the security of the cmmtry' internment m;1y be approprfate. Hm thfa only
n»ta:rt'i the dd!nition inqniry: what constitutes :c«•i:ious and legitimate reason or :1ubvcrsivc' activity?
25 c;c1v c.wmu'lllilf}' 257-258.
24 This chapter d<.H~s nut address another ad1ninistrative measure an occupying power may impose under
c;crv. th;it of a»igning residenc('s to C('rtain dviliam.
25 GClV mt 43,
26 CCIV
260.
27 Ibid 261,
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!n exphinini:r dk pt•riodk rt'Vtc'\V rt:·quirenwnt, the Comm<:ntary <;taks tfnt 'no protechcd
should b,~ kept in
residc•nce or in an iliternrnent camp 1()r ;l
t]me than dw
security oftbe Detaining SL\te demands·. 2 ~
Thus the LOi\C provides sif.,'1lificant infi1m1ation for whlm and how civi!iam and, as previomly discmst~d. cornb.itams m.iy be detained. Th(~h' is varying amount of guidance on trt\ltrnenJ
condiriom, mon• for P(JWs th;m for civiliam. i\nd for rdt\lS<~. there is more infrlrmarion. JS
there should b.:. for review and release of conduct-based ci>ilLm detention than status-l:Msed
PO\V captivity. i\ll in all. the civilian and PO\V dett-ntion ugimes ext.mt in L'\C have n~rnim·d
tht•ir utility. !ndeed these• systems form th,~ b.isis for military tnining, manuals and regulations
mi detentfon.2'' The dutleni:res <lrise nor so much from d(~tention in [/\Cs but in NJACs. i\nd
this thrt~shold question of the quantum of Lnv available is made mon· dit11cult by non-~tate
acrors and Amied conflicts \vitbout clear emk
i),~r:;on

3 Non-international armed conflict

3.1 Authority to detain
Unlike in an !AC, during: NlAC. there is au ongoing deb«te about wht:tber LOAC provides
authority to der-.iin.
One view is that '[i]t is logical tb;it .. , ~ince fin a Nl/\C] there is no conflict betwet'n two or
rnort~ sovereigns. the [law] ofnon-imemational Jrmed conflid should b~· silent, in deforenn: to
rntimnl lJ<V, on questions of detention'. 30 That natJon;il law tend' to be domestic criminal law
and procedure, allowing h\v enforcement to d<'.tain individtuls only based on their conduct, not
based on ilicir stam> or concerns they post~ a security threat.
On the other side of the dd>ate is tht• daim that even the limitt>d .imount ofLOAC applicable to N!AC implicitly recognises authority to deprive people of their lilwrty. Und,•r tbis argu··
ment, LC>AC's

reference to 'persons, hos de combat by ... dt'k'ntion' and 'ref:,>1Jhrly constituted courts in
Common Artide 3, and rn persons 'interned' in the Second Additional Protocol, Artides
3 and 6, are superfluous if not understood to be accompanied by an autbority to detain or
intern n>spectivdy.H

28 Ihid. ·rhe Commentiry al;o pnnide> that th<; n;,-i<'\V procedure; from
and that in conducting reviev.s .it least twice a ye.ir that

c;c:i V a:re rh<• minim urn ;;randard

the respomible authorities -..vill be bound w nke into .in:ount the progn'" of l'Vdlb - whkh i;; often
rap.id - and change> as a wmlt of "vhir h it may be f\mnd that the conti rming int<:mnh:!lt or :migned
ru.:idencc of tlt<0 person concemnl are no longer jrnrified.
29 See. amrmg others, US Anny Regulation 19(!--198, Enemy Pri;.:mei:> of \l/ar. Retained Persmmd.
Civilian lnter!k'<~ and ()ther Detainees (1 (ktob(n 1997),
30 Gabor Rmu 'An Apprnis:<l of US Practice Iteliting to .Enemy c:,nnbatant>' {2007) JO i TllTll 232.
241; see also Lawrence l--Iill-Cawthorm: and Dapo Akande. 'Locating the Leg::1l I:h>is fin Detention in
Non-International Armed Conflicts: A Rejoind<:r to Aurel Sari' Lifll.:T<iik! ('1 Jmw 201.4). www.
ej il talk .org! locating-the-I \'fi,'<ll-basis-for-der.enti \ll 1-ii H1on-i n tenu ti 01 ia l,,.,.mned-c011flict,;-;1-rej oi nd<'ft<1-;1m1• l-s:iri,

31 I)avid ·ruck, 'lJz:tPntion by Amwd c;rnup$: Overcoming C:h,,lJeng:es to f·1mnanitarian Action' (2011)
9.'\ (835) fR.RC765; see ,,J,o Ezequ.id Heft{», 'Dc'tention in NlACs: A Pledge in Favor ofrhe Applkation of lHL' Opi11i<' .Juris \16 !.'vby 2014), btrp:!/opiniojuris,org/21.114!05/161i:,,'1.lest-pmt-detl'l1rionni:Jrs-pll•dge-favour-:ipplicatio11-i bl!.
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Thjs ;irgnmem rctleci:s dw te1i;;imi, almost a dash, bt'twt•en tbe Llw c•nforcenwm/lmman
rigbts pandigm for dt~temimi and that of LOi\C. [ndec•d the rlisag:reenwtH un the isstk' oi
LC)AC amhority to detain in NL-1.C only increased ]n May 2014, following the High Court of
England aud Wales' decision ill Molwm11cd ti 1\-Iinistry
' 2 There, foe High Court ruled
that at least as applied to tbe United Kingdom, LOi\.C dot:> not provide detention authority in
NL-1.C Tht: Cmm comidert•d the LOAC applicabk· to NL-1.C and stated that
[n]either [the' relevant portions of the Genc•va Conv.:~ntiom nor Addirional Protocol HI
contains any express sL\temem that it is lawful to <.foprive persons of their liberty in an
armed conflict m whkb tbest• provisiom apply. All that tbey do is to set out certain
minimum standards of trc•atment \Vhicb mmt be 1fforded to persons who ,ire detained
during mcb an armed conflkr. 33
Underpinning the Court's decision that LOi\C does not provide authority to detain in N!i\C
is that there is such little law from which to draw.

3.2 NiAC model of detention
There is some, a!hdt not much, in the way of 'black-letter' LOi\C concerning detention in
NIAC. Common Article 3 of the four 1949 Genev,1 Convc•mfom, but applying to NIA.Cs,
refers tu memben; oftbe anned fr1rces placed i.n detention in its cak'g<)risation of'pen;om taking
no active part in bostlhtit•s' .34 Common },rtide 3 provides :m important minimum standard of
treatment in detention, tbat those not actively pa1tidpating in the amwd conflict be treated
lmnianely and protected from violence, from being made a
from onn:age~ upon pers<mal dignity and from the passing of sentences and rhe carrying om of executions without a
pronouncement by a regularly comti.mted court 35
32 Serdar ;\Johammcd v Minfrtry
!20I4J EW!IC L'\69 (QB).
33 Ibid~ 239 (Q.£5). ·rhe Court then took note of the argument oftlw UK Minbtry ()fI)ctence th;it a
power to detain is implicit in C(:l-!V co1nrnon art 5 and APIL !bid. 'The C:ourt ·wpnt >o far a,: to
acknowledge that 'jtjhis argmnent lrns the support of some actlfomic writers and of the lntinnational
Connnittee of the Iltd Cross·. mentioning in particular Jelena Pejic, a legal adviser to the IC:RC. ·who
has written that '[ijntemnwnt is ... dearly <l mc:.hure that can be taken in non-.intenndon;il armed
conflict. as ('Videnced by the• language of [i\PHj, \Nhiz:h nwntions intemrnem in Articles 5 and 6
n»pectivdy'. Ibid i: 240. quoting Jelena 1\:iic. 'Procedural Principle; and Safoguards for Internnwnt!
Administrativ<~ Detention in Armed Conflict and other Situ,1tinns of Violence' (2005) 87(858) JP.RC
575, 377. 'fhe Court then rejected this approach: ibid~~: 24 I-246.
34 ()nits faa. commGn art.:\ would o:eern w only apply to a NL\C:. but cotuts in the US and Eurnpe h;t\T'
ruled that its lxu;dine levd of protections apply in all. armed conflicts, however characterised, See
H,und,:m t'
548 US 557 (2006). See aho .Military awi Pmamilirary Adfririe.< in and t{~tiinst Ni;ma·
,~na (\!it<11<1;;ua 1' US! p.986J ICJ Rep 14. 4: 218, stating that
C:omnion Artide J which is rnmmon to ;.ill frmr c;eneva Conventions of 1:2 August 1949 dcfows
certain ruk~s to he applied in the armed nmflicts ofa mm-international char:KkL 'fhere i;; no doubt
that, in the event ofintemational armed conflicts, these rule> afro constitute a minimum yardstick.
in addition to the mme elaborate mleo ·which aw also to apply to intermtional nmflkts; and they
an' rules which, in the Conn\ opinion, reflect vdmt the Court in 1949 called 'elementary con.'iclerntiom of humanity'.
T!ri\CU:lilN I' T,;di{ {i)ecisiiln <'II !he
Appeal 011 }uri,·diaiimj (Case no rr-941-A. IC'JY /\ppPah c:bamb('r, 2 Ocwh•r 1995) ~ 93 {holding th,,t common art } i> rmtmn:u:y international law and applirabl0 in both NlAC and lAC:).
:SS See GCIH-IV art 3,
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The only other LO/\C potentially applicable to NI/\C is .i~dditioml Protocol[] to tht' 1949
Geneva Conventions,'" Artkle 5 ofi\.dditional Protocol Il provides guidance on 'pt•rsom \vbosc'
liberty has bc•en re~tricted' 37 while ,A,_rtidc• 6 discum~s 'penal prosecutions',''"' Yet d<~spite th<~
infi:Jmiative sounding tides of those articles. neither they uor any otlwr part of Additional
Protocol !I provides derails ofhn1-v di:'tt'ntion in NIAC is to be• comhicted. 39
Supplementing this limited body oflaw hrnvever is considerable custom and practke. For
example, the• ICRC, in its Cmtoniary International Law Study. identified a number of dekntion issues in NI/\C for \Vhich costom has developed in the form of practice. military manuah
and United Nations Documents. 4'' The lCltC is also 'leading a m;ijor comnltation process on
how to streut,>then legal protection for persom deprived of their liberty 'in. relation to NLl\C', 41
The United Natiom has issued opt'rJting procedures filr detention in pe.Ke opc'radons, many of
which occur during NIAC. 42 ,;dditionally. Dennnrk led the recc'tH Copenhagen Proc,-ss. a
multi-year effort involving representatives from other countries, ret,>i.onal alld inkrnational
organisations, and civil mci<~ry which (k;veloped principles designed to guide the conduct of
dett'ntion in intematioml military operations}' Th<·se approaches art' important rt~minders that
in the ;ibsence of detailed law. LOJ\C-ba~ecl custom, practice and policy orler ;iltematives to fill
tht' fa CUll <l,

4 Challenges and a proposal
4 .1 Quantllm of law vs prevalence of conflict
As outlined aboVt>, while· th.:~r<' are reforences to detention in the bodies oflx;.v governing both
LA,_Cs and NIACs, there is an unhdpfol inverse relationship between the arn.onnt ofhw avaihhle
and th<'. applicability of that !a\v. In the aftermath of the Second World War, NlACs are far

36 Potentially applicable as not all NlA.{:s trigger APlL For APH to apply. there must be an armed rnnflict
which is not an I.AC and
which take place in the tz'.rriwry 0L1 Lhgh Contracting Party bdween its armed frirces and dissident
;u:rned fm:ces or otht•r organized arnw<l groups which, nnder n•sJmmible comrn:.irnl. exercise such
control over a part ofits territory as to enable them to carry out rnstained and com-eru•d milit;uy
operatiom and to implement this PwtocoL
APH an JO)
37 APH art 5.
33 APII an 6,
39 Pejic (n 53) 377.
40 s,~,, Cil1L rr l 18-128. Th<>se rules con•r the prnvisfrm of necessities w persom deprived of th,•ir
liberty. accommodation for women and children, Iootion ()f i ntemment and detention centres, pilfagt'
of personal bdongings, n't•ording and notification ofpemmal details, IC:RC access, corresponde1Kc,
visit>. respfft for convictiorn; and
practices, rd<«l>e and return.
4.l Se<' ICitC, ''l'he IC:RC's \Vork on Strengthening Legal Prntenion' (31Jannary20!4). www.incorg/

e11g!what-we-do/other-<Ktivities/devdop1nent-ihl!sm•11gthening-legaJ-protection-ibl-dercntiorL
btm.
42 United Nation{ Interim Standard ()pernti.ng Procedures for I)etention in United Nations Peace ()pt•tations (25 January 2010),
43 Se,: the Copenltagen Proces,,: on the Handling of Detainec's in Int<cmatkmal Military Operations,
'Principles and Guidelines' {19 October 2012), tnn,dkienl~/medialUM/En:glLh-site/l)ocuments/
Po1itics-and-d.ipJ01nacy/Copenhangen%20Vrocess';,;,3opri1iciples'l(.2()and'?''20Guideli1w,,:,pdf
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more pn;v;ik·nt44 but for which then'. is far less law, both ill general and as applit·d to
detenxlon. 45
An armed conflict involving non-~t.ate actors, even di~tnrarely located in s«H'.ral countri<'S.
cannot constitute an [AC. Thm the more extensive law that govern> detention in LA..G; is

inapplicable.
challenge.
To apply
f,>rounded in
frlf a policy
al-Q;mia:

Th,'. lack of b\v applicable to N[AC> poses one, but certainly not the only,
!AC detention pmvisions hi NJA.. C could be part of the solution, necessarily
policy not Iaw. Profossor Ryan Goodman [us ;irticufated a tbn•e-pait rationale
of applying the bw governing lA.C to NJACs agairnt non-state acmrs like

The first is a reactive reason: simply put, many commenrators and practitiom·rs have applied
tlw la\> ofimemational armed conflict to the conflict with al-Qaeda by analo,gy. [t's a prevalent practice that's used, for example, in dcbat-es about v>:liether or not Wt~ cm hold
fighters tmti1 the ce\\ation of bosti!lties and with or without access to an attonwy. The

analog or the rderent in thme discussions is often foremational armed confl.kt. And if that's
a prevalent mode of discourse or argument, then we at least need to conflict, to t'val.uatt•
tbo't' kinds of claims.
A second reason is an affirmative one. On my view·, it's valid to tm' the law of international armed conflict as an analor:,')I. ln fact, if'IAe have to think oLm ;maloi:.,>y, it's the
dmest fit or closest approximation - especially the Fomth Geneva Convention - frH· questions of who may be detained and what type' of activities on the part of civiliam are rnbj«ct
to detention. Thar is, tht• rules cotitained in the Civilians Convention, are the closest analog
tbat we have and therd()re the best lc'fi:n'nce point for trying to approximate what the law
of arm<~d conflict sboul.d look like nr \vilI look hkt' when it applies in a non international
xcenario like the conflict with al-Qaeda.
The third reagon is the strongest, and it's an affi.miative argument not just by way of
analogy. The argument hen' is that the law in international armed conflict establishes ;m
outer boundary of permissive action, The id{''' is fairly simpk>, which is that the faw of
armed conflict uniformly involves more exacting, more restrictive obligations on parties in
imemational amied conflict than in non international armed conflict. \X/e could even state
this point as a nux:im; if states have authority ro engage in particular practices in an i.nk•rnational anued cmiflict. they a fortiori possess the authority to undertake the same' practices
in non international armed conflict, or simply pm, w}utever \$ pemiittt•d in int0maticmal
armed conflict is permitkd in non intenntimial armed conflict. Therefi:ire, if the law of
armed conflict permits a state to detain civilians in international armed conflict, tbe bw of
armed conflict surely pt'm1its stat<~s to dt•tain civi.ham in a non inrematfonal am1ed contlict.
Tbe same logic does not apply to prohibitfom or prt:>O\criptive rules: it does not follow that

44 l'or ex;unpk according to NA'f(), in 20()() there were 25 armed conflict;; around the 'World. NAfO,
'Stati;tics on Anne<l Conflicts ;mmnd the World', nato.gov.si/eng!topic!thre;m-to->ocm'ity/statistics.
()fthme, only one, the cnntlin b«tweon India and Pakistan, W;'IS of an international nature. See also
Anned Contlin I)atahase, ;Kd.ii'5.org,
45 ·rhe IC:JzC assert,; that then' are four key arna> in which LOAC governing deumtion in NIAC 'falls
short': (l) conditiom of detention, (ii) protection frrr especially vulnerable groups of det,unec'>. (iii)
grnunds and procedures for i memrnent and (iv) tr:msfors of detainees from ono amhority to anotb('L
!CRC:, 'Detention in N<m-inteniational Armed C:ontlict: The lC:RC\ Work on Stwngthening Legal
Protection' (31 January 2014), www, icrc .org/cng/what-we-do/ othor-activ.ities/devdopment.-.ihl.:
stru1i,>thenii1g-legal-protection-il1l-detention, hun.
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iftbe law of armed conflict forbids staks frorn engaging in a practice in international armed
conflict tint th~· Lnv would also forbid states from. eng&ging in that
ill non international am1ed conflict!''
Professor Goodman's approach amehoraks, but does not folly solve, the probk'nL Applying
the robust IA.C law to NIAC still results in difficulties. The first of these is the inability for
status-based detention based mi Ceneva Convention Ill becaust' non-state actors do nnt qualify
as POWs.

4,2 Challenge posed by non-state actors
The problem is not that the Geneva Conventions make no pmvisfon for non-state actors, they
do. In lA.C, nwmbers of militias or volmiteer corps who make up the ,mned forces of a party to
th.:~ conflict qualify for PO\V statm and tteatment.47 Even militias or volunteer ,~orps which do
not directly comprise tlk' armed forces ofa p:uty may qualify for POW status and treatmenL 48
And, interestingly, there is nor a geographic limitation: the prnvisions of Gene\1;1 Convention
Hl apply to militia' operating 'in or outliiU<' their territory', 49
Nmiethdess, even if Gent~va Convention HI applic'd to Nli\C, it' provisions would not
apply to most non-state actors involved in cuneut or n•cent anned conflicts. Thar·s became the
non-state actors do not make up the milhary of a patty to the conflict or comply with the conditions for free-standing militias or vohmtet'r coq>>. 50
Consider the arm<'d conflict in ,\(ghanistan following the September l l attacks. At the outset
the conflict was an Ii\C;, a \Var between two high contracting parties to the Geneva Conventimi~, the US and A(ghanistan. Status as au IAC triggered at least the potential for the application
of Gt•neva. Convention IH governing P(}Ws.
M.t•mbers ofa!-Qaeda could pot,e.'ntially qualify tClr POW srntus and treatment as membt'rs of
a militia. But there does not seem to be a credible argument that al-Qaeda complies \Vith the
predicate requirement~ ofa conunand stmcture, fixed distinctive sign, carrying their am1s openly
and folkn>ving the LOAC.
The assessment of the Taliban, then representing the f,l\Wemment of i\(islnnhtan, is mort'
difficult. In denying the Taliban POW status, the US claimed dut even if the Taliban constituted the am1<·d forces of Afghanistan they would still need to nwet \Vi th the fbm-part tt'St. This
argument was criticised as not being supportt-d by a plain reading of the text of Gt•neva

46 .Ryan c;oodman. 'The Serond Annual Solf-\Van:en Lecture in International and Operational L1•v·
(2009) '..W! Military LR 237, hn pemusive ::irgmnent'.: fr1r applying the l::iw of intematiorul armed
conflict to non-intematinn,1l armed conflict, panicul::irly in the are<l of detenti.on, see Sass6h and Ohnn
{n 9}.
47 GClll art4.
48 Se<' s 2J. ,,bove,
49 GCUl mt 4.
50 Following the 9/ 11 attl<:ks, the US considered thzc >tarns under imem:itional humanitarian law both of
the 'faliban, which comtitnted the govermnem of A(i;li:mistan at the time, and of al QauL. which
based its terror.1st organisation in .Afgbnistan with 'faliban coment, George VJ/ Bush. Tinnune 'freatnwnt of Taliban and al Qaeda Ikt;.iinees' J\,fomorandnm \1 February 2002), W\VW,pegcus!archive!
White~House!bmh_rnemo_20(}2o207_eilpdf; Jay S Bybee, 'Status of'faliban ForcL'S under Article 4
of the 'fhinl Geneva Convention of! 949' Mem.orandurn Opinion for the Coumel to the President (7
February 2002), ww\v.fas.urg!if}>/agem:y/doj!olc/r,,Jibau.pdf (Status of'faliban Forces J\formnandnm
Opinion).
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Conv,•ntion m;' 1 yet the argument finds support from the lCTU: and is perm;tsive at a norm;Hive k•veL !n terms of the ICilC support. the comrnenttry to Gern:va Convention rn, in
c•xplaining another cakgo1y of persons who qualify for POW status, refors to the attributes of
armed forces as 'they \Vear unifonn, they have an organized hierarchy ;md th<~y know and
respect the Lnvs and (ustoms ofwar', 52
More broadly, if the ;1rmed forces of a party m the conflict do not have to meet the frmr
conditions a perverse result follows whereby mt'mbers of regular armed frirct's would be governed by lmvt•r stamfards than rhose applicable to militia and volunteer forces. 53
The answer. and its not a new one, is again rooted in policy - treat unprivileged belligerents
as POWs. fr is somewbat mq>rising that the US wrestled witb the question of whether to classify
the Talilnn and al-Qaeda as PO\Vs, ln previous conflicts tht• US detaiued individuals and
tn•ared them under dw tt•nm of a st~tus to which tbey did not qualify as a matter ofbw. During
the K.orean conflict, the US did not recognise the lt•gi.tiniacy of Chinese intervention. R.egardh~ss of the accuracy of that view, the ;;ignificmce is that the US did not believe that memhcn of
tbe Chinese Anny qualified as POWs as a inatkr offaw, but trt';lted tht•m as such as a mattt•r of
policy.
Similarly, during the Vietnam War, the US, along with its allies, 54 joilic•d South Vietnam in
fighting an array of ene.mies associated \Vith North Vit•tnam, Some, like the North Vi<'tnanwse
Anny (NVJ'\), \Vt're clearly entjt!ed to POW status and treatment. With respect m odwr forces,
notably the Viet Cong, tbe US nonetheless held .Article 5 tribunals55 and determined tht'.y were
not PO\Vs. Nonetheless, the US then treated the Vit~r Cong as PO\X/s as a matter of policy, aml
housed them in camps adjacrnt to the POW camps for captured NVA. 5" Key to tbe US approach
5 ! See Silvia Borelli, '{;a~ting Light on the I«'gal Hlack l1ok fot.enntional L1.w and .Detentions Abrnad
in the "War on 'fenor"' {2005) 87 JRR.C J9,
52 CC:lll Cmmieniflry 65.
53 See Status of'falib3.n Force> Memorandum Opinion (n 50) 5 .. As rhe US D<~partment ofJmtice indicated (emphasis in m:iginal),

[t]here h no t'vidence that any of the CPW\ dratfors or ratifiers believed that memben of the
regular armed force> ought to b,• governed by lower tfamianiz in their conduct of w;u:fan' than those
applkabk to militia :md volunteer IJ)tces.
54 Notably Amtrali:.L New Zealand, tht' Rt'j.mhlk ofKorea and Thailand,
SS In Vietnam, the US ronduct of ;\rt 5 tribunals was little more than bringing the captured individual
bdim: an US .Army officer who inquired ahom the drcumst.:mces of captme and al.Ended th!:' individual
the opportunity to pwvid<,~ input. See aho c;eoffrey C:m:n. Eric Talbot Jemen and Sean \Vatts. 'Un,krc..
5t;mding the I)istinct Ftrncrion of the Comh,lt.mt Status Review Tribunak A Respoww to .Hlodu'r·
(2007) 116 Y<l!e Law }immal f><,d;:ct Part 327 (describing how the US identifa~d. as a matter 1.lf policy.
groups qualifying for PCl\V status, including Viet Cong Main Foret'>. ViN C:ong Local Fore<'s, North
Vietnam.es<' Army Units and Organised Forces oflm~gnfar c;uerilfas and Sdf-.Defonce Forces who had
not engaged in terrorism, !'i1botage or spying, lJS Military Assistance C:omm.md, Vietnam, l)iwctive No
381-546, Military Intelligem·c: Combined Screening of Detainer"' (27 Dec<'m.ber 1967). rq,rint<•d
in Howard Levie. f)ocumml.< 011 Prfruners of ~Viir (US NavJl \Var College 1979) 743),
56 Bfank and Noo1w (n 12) 2330-2334 (quoting the fr.rm.er Military A~sistance Conurnrnd Vfotnam
(MACY) SrnffJudgz: Advocatt' George Prugh on detention oper.1tions during the Yietam \Var):
fvjirtn;dly none of[theJ classic !TAC] conditiom exiskd,,., It was n'nainly ,ugnahle that many Vier
Cong did not nH>et tlHc criteria of guerillas entitled to prison('r of war st.ttm under Article 4.
rc;c:nri. .However, civil incarceration and niminal tri:.<l of the great nrunber of Viet c:ong Wa\ WO
much f<)r tht• civil resources at hand.
Blank and Noorw then provide" copy of the MACY policy directin' ''1hidi required that meinbers of
the Viet Cong would be d:mified :.md treated as PO\lh.
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\Vas that tht• policy application of Geneva Convention HI to die Viet
was nearly identical
to the legal application oftht: Convention to the NV/\, Tlw ICl-lC, in n:\icwing die trc"<Hrnc11t
conditiom of both the NV/\. and Vic't Cong. hbcllcd the US imtmcrion to ;ipply Geneva Conve1ition HI as a

mattt~r

of policy:

a brilliant expression of a liberal and rt•alistic attitude .. ,. This text could very \vdl be ;l mmt
import;mt one in the history of tbc humanitarian law, frlr it is the first tinw , , . that a government gm•s far beyond the requirements of the Geneva Convention in an official imtrnction to its armed forces. 57
Treating unprivik,gt:d bdligerents in NIAC ;<$ PO\lVs means the (ktaim't'S rc•ccivc tbc bend!ts of the treatment provision of Geneva Convt:ntion ff[ bur they are sdH not entitled to the
coml>at;uit's privilegc•, 5'' Thm the capturing frlrce may stiJI pnm.,cute them for their violabom of
the LOAC. 59
But t'ven thfa >econd policy act d{)es not fi11Iy address the problem ht~rnuse status-based POW
detention does not require revie\v of dett.,ntion aud assumes a ckar end point, which in many
NIACs does not exist.

43 Reviewing and ending status-based detention
Rc:-'tlr<lless of whether one re;Khes the conclusion that the Taliban and ;ii-Qaeda were entitled
tti POW treatment as matter of law or of policy, a practical concern with the application of
Geneva Convention II! n•maim, The concern tlmvs not from what Gem·va Convention II!
provides, hut in what it docs not. The'. application of Geneva Conventjon HI yidds a robust
guide on POW' treatment conditions, fr{)m quarters, fo(x!, dot1iing, bygieiit.,, medical attention,
to rdigiou~, intdlectual and piiyskaI activities, What ir doetn ·t do fa provide much in the way
of guidance on release, That i$ not a criticism of the Convention but J statement of its i nhen•nt
limitations given that the• detention t«:t,,rime is status based.

57 United Srntes Army C:enter ofMi!it;uy I·fotory, 'Th<> US Army in Vietnam. Prirnner\ ofWarand\V;1r
C2rimes'. y.,ww,history,;n:my.mil!hook>/Vietnam/Law-War/la>v-04.htm. During Vietnam, the US
provid;cd an example of how applying L()AC :tS a mattc'r of policy can yield tangible, ni.eanini:,,mil
results. More recently the US provided an exampk' of how tme:iq}lained, unverifiable polky anions
yield little. In 2006 the US Department ofDefome i>rnwl a directive clai.rning J$ a nntkr ofpolily, the
US military would comply with the more robust JAC law 'during all armed nmflict>, however charact.erized': I)cpartment of Defense Directive 231Ul1.E, L1w of War Program. (9 May 2006) ~ 4.L
www ,dric mil/whs/directives/ corres/ pdf!251101 e,pdf Yer a:; of this writing., $fHllc' eight yearo later,
what exactly that policy decision meam remains uncfoar. With which convc•ntiom or part ofconventiom gi:weming the conduct of hostilities is dw US complying? \Vithout knu\\ing that, huw would the
lCI:t(; or intem<ltioml community know if and how well the US is doing ;i, it ,:ays it is?
58 But, see c;eoffCom, 'Thinking the Unthinkable: I--L-.,, the 'fime Come to Offer Combatant Immunity
to Non-State Actors?' {2011) 22 Stanford IJ>R 253 (discussing affording non-stat'' actor' PO\V status
and u.nnbatam immunity),
59 .Even here then: is potential frir helpfo.l conflation between lAC: and NIAC: law and GClll and CC:lV,
A Pl contains a list of fnndamental gnaramees on the t:reatnient ofperoom in tl1e povver 0L1 party w ''
contlict recogi1ioed a'i custom;1ry intenurional bw, In particular, API art 75 provides prnn»s right1e akin
to those from the lCX:PR.. 'fhe vast m~jority of the world. 0<.rme 174 st.ates, are party w APL Hm for
tlm;e stares that are not, portions of AP!, induding art 75, arc binding as customary .internation;il law,

" point even rJie US acknmvledge>. \Vhite Home, 'New Actiom on c;uantainmo and Det;1inee Policy'
Pact Sheet (7 Man:h 2()11). www,whitdiouse.gov/the--pre>S-otfice/2()11/03/07 /fact-sheet-newanio11s-gua11t-ru1no-and--detainee-polky.
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Geneva Convention l U applies 'fron1 tlw time la qualifying pc•rson] fal![sl into tbe power of
the ern'.my and until their fin.il rdeaSt'. and rep;itriation' ."" ,'.\$ previously disnis>t'd, in terms of
timing of n:k•ase, tbe Convention state's only that 'prisom•rs of w:H shaE be released and rqx1t1iated withour delay after the cessation ofhostilities'." 1
Geneva Convention rn presuppo><'S status as an immutable quality, OllCt' ,\ bdhgc•rent qu:1lifit:s for POW trt•,itment their status remains as a POW fi:ir the duratJon of the conflict."' If
during the war in tbe FalkLmds. the British dN:iined a uniformed member of tht• i\rgenthw
Army. tb:it individual's status rem.<im constant, a member of tbe armed forces of a party to tbe
conflict.
Hur the condmion of NLc\Cs involving non-state actors who increasfogly operate from
more than one state and are aligned to varying
witb other organised armed groups 'fa not
so stDiightfrlrward 63 IZemruiug to the Falklands t•xampie, foere an· not gradients of being a
rnember of the armed forces ofArgentina, .~ither one is or is noL But there· are degrees ofmembership in groups like al-Qaeda as well ;is questions about tbe dfoct is or!t~ \Vere to renounce
their membership.
Geneva Convention !V security dt•tention review medunisms cim1d bridge tbe g:ips created
by status in N!AC not lending itself to the bina1y !AC detention wgimt> and by the uncertainty
of when NLc\Cs end,
This would mean serni-annua! revJe\\'S of whdber tht• det.'lint•e still poses ;m imperative
security threat. Consistenr with Geneva Convention !V tbe:'t' reviews would be held automatically and occur with '' rebnttab!e prernrnption that the detain<'<'. no longer pmes a security threat.
};n administrative board could conduct the reviews so !ong as tbere are sufficient im:licia of
independence and impartiality, The board could stm comprise members of the capturing party\
amwd forces. But the hoard members would need to he under a St~parate chain cf command.(.,
Whatever dedsiom the hoard recommends could he subject to revit'.\V but the only permissible
modification \Vm1Id be those in tbe detainee's f:wonr. Tbh nwan' that 1.vhen• the board recommends continued detention, a higher level of tbe capturing party's govc>rnnwnt could reverse
dut detention and direct rd<'<lSe. Bur where the board recommends release. the revit"l-V could
not reverse that decision. 65

60 CCII! art 5,
61 GClll art 118.
62 And undc'r CC'.Ill art 7, 'prisom'r of war may in no cirn1mscmces renounce in part or in ''ntirety th''
rights sectu'<cd to them' under thr' ComYntion.
63 Consider the dynamic relationship between al-Qaeda groups, in Pakistan and .Afghanistan but previously in Iraq and in the ,l\rabiau peninrnfa and al-Qaeda in thi• Maghreb. See 'L<>tter to '1.l-2'.arqai from
al-2'.awahri' MSNBC (11. ()(tolwr 2005), www.nbrnews.com/id/9666242/m/world_news-krrnrism/
t/letter-a.l-zarqawi-al-zawahri (describing communication between the head of al-Q;wda in Paki:1t'.m
;rnd the head of al-Qaeda in lrc1q); Fiden C:ollh and lfayley Peterson, 'f..Iead of al Qaeda in Pakistan
Ayrnan al-2'.awahri rommnnic1ted with N,1sser al-\Vuhayshi, the Head nf al Qaeda in the Anbian
Peninrnla' Dilily Aiaif (4 ,l\ugm;t 1013) (descrihing cmmnunication between the ht•ad ()f al-Qaeda in
Paki>tm and hi5 counterpart in Yt~men),
64 \Vhile this seems rntmrer-intuitive, it c.rn and is dork\ For example, in the US, military defence
coumd. military judg,» and those 5erving as impector grnernls are placed in a S<'j.'arate chain of
comntand and are only subject to that C()mmand\ or;,krs and evaht;ition,
65 'fhis is similar to how the US conducts administrative bo;1nh to detwrmine whether or not to dfadwrge
service members. WlMtd'er decision the board makes is reviewed ,;nd cm be modified. but only to the
service member\ benefit, See US Anny Jz,egnlation 635-200, .±ktive IJmy Enlisted AdministrJtive (6
June 2005}.
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5 Conclusion
Geneva Conwnriom HI and TV provide ;; solid dc-tentfon framnvork fix Lc\G Gent'VJ
Convention HI recogni3t'S broad, status-bast•d dt'tentfon. [t provide;; consid<~rable j<:,"llidance on
treatment. bm is of Iimitc·d me in rerrns of release. Genev'.1 Convemion IV applies :< higlwr,
conduct-based threshold fix detention. The treatment provfainns of Gcnt•va Convention !V are
less robust than for Geneva Convention IH, bm unlike status-based POW dc•tentfon, civilian
conduct-lnsed detention provides for a revit·w process.
A hybrid applk,ltion ofG,·neva Conventions m and IV could thus form t11e basis ofa NL\C
det.·mion n•gime - apply the Geneva CouventJom as a matter ofpolicy to NL\Cs, to aHmv for
&tatm-based detention of non-state act.on but treanurnt as a POW. Such detention would tben
be subject to the review process from Geneva Convention !V.
i\llowing status-based detention of mm-state actors would result in over tm·adth, more individuals being cfotain<~d than would the case if the detaining entity \Vere fr)rced to identify specific
threat-based actions warranting dd(~ntion. But thc•re are some implicit checks on how such
detention would occur. \Ver« a military to bd.ieve an individual a member of al-Qat•da and
ordered his detention, and it ttmied out the individual while sympathetic to al-Qaeda \Vas not
a member as such or conducting any activitit'S at al-Qaeda's behest, the~ individual would be
releast'd no later tban fol101ving the first six month revic'\V. And \vhile six months ofunnece;sary
detention is problematic it's a finitt· problem. And in a counter-insuq,rency environment, statusbased detention of non-srate actors would in somt' ways be ,;df-rc•gulating, A milita1y commander \Vho d<•tains too nnny people on the basis of sotatus \Vho do not in facr pose a security
thmit \Vi.ll undermine their relationship wiili the local populace and tbeir perceptions of
legitimacy.
There will inevitably be over- or uuder-hre,idth in any detention system and indeed any faw
or legal system, Tht• question is who should incur tht• tish or pay the costs. Betwe«n members
of an an11cd force who comply with the LOAC, the civilian population and non-state actors,
non-state actors should hear the risk of inevitable over-breadth from a statm-hased detention
regime,
This approach fa vn!nerahle to criticisnL .But much of the criticism, while legally correct, is
practically unbelpfuL'"' This chapter opentes on the assumption that following a 'successfrif
decomtruction of this proposal, critics mmt shifr to positivism and a proposed solution, And any
solution would seem, by definition, to look a lot like some combination of Geneva Conventions HI and IV. M.oreover, there are considerable advantages, pncrically and in establishing
legitimaq', of tt>thering a detention n•s>tme to the world's most ratifa•d treaty and which has
fomwd the basis for how· militarie$ around the world train to conduct detention operations.

66 In '' similar ';{•in, thb chapter ignores the discussion of whether there are only t<.vo
of individn:ik prisoners of war or civHian, or if then• is some alternat(' citegory involving unprivileged bdhgerents, 'I'he majority view is that under APl\ negative' definition ofcivihan - a civili:rn is any pemm
who does not he.long to a PO\V qualifying: category- the universe is himry; if rnmemw i;; not a POW
rh,~n they are a civilian. See APJ arr 50{1} ·rhe IC:ItC CommmhuT hovwver notes that 'things are not
alway;; w straighlli>nv:mf ,;nd that an individual who did not q1mlify as ;i matter of law as a PO\V

wnnld still bc treared as such. AP Cim1mema1y ~~i 176 L 1736. But the ddiate ot\vhctberthere are two
or more c;iwgori'" of actors on the b:ittlefidd does not nwaningfi.1lly advance the debate of detention
tre:itmcnt and rde,1se of nrm-st;1te Cl(tor>.
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